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FRANCO'S SPAIN AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS (1945-1975)¹

Enrique Moradiellos

During the rule of General Francisco Franco, Spain had a highly complex and tense relationship with the European integration process in the years preceding and following the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) under the Treaty of Rome in March 1957. In order to understand the fragile nature of these relations between Spain and the EEC, one must start at a crucial, decisive, point: 1945.

World War Two: A difficult legacy

In that critical year, as a result of the Allies' unconditional victory in World War II, the Francoist dictatorship reaped the first fruits of its previous foreign policy during war times. This policy had been shaped by a combination of moral sympathy towards the Italian-German Axis and scarcely veiled hostility toward the so-called “Democratic-Masonic-Communist conspiracy.”² In fact, while Franco's Spain had not overstepped the threshold of anti-Ally belligerence due to exhaustion after the civil war, its dismal economic situation and its extreme strategic vulnerability, it had also never concealed its preference for an Axis victory or its fear of Ally triumph. It shall suffice to recall the famous speech that Franco gave on 17 July 1941, when a Spanish military contingent (the so-called Blue Division) was sent to fight on the eastern front against the Soviet Union.³ He began by stating the connection between his own effort in the Spanish Civil War and the Axis campaigns: “The die is already cast. The first battles were joined and won on our soil”. Thereafter, he anticipated the final defeat of the Allies whatever the United States of America might do in the future: “The war has taken a bad turn for the Allies and they have lost it. [...] The campaign against Soviet Russia, with which the plutocratic world now shows solidarity, can no longer distort the results. Stalin, the criminal red dictator, is now an ally of democracy”. And finally he expressed his fervent desire for the total victory of Germany:

At this moment, when the German armies lead the battle for which Europe and Christianity have for so many years longed, and in which the blood of our youth goes to join that of our comrades of the Axis as a warm expression

¹ This article is part of a historical research project financed by the Spanish *Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad* (HAR2013-41041-P).

² Paul Preston, *Franco. A Biography* (London: Harper Collins, 2004) and Elena Hernández-Sandoica and Enrique Moradiellos, Enrique. “Spain and the Second World War”, in Neville Wylie (ed), *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 241-267.

³ Xavier Moreno Juliá, *The Blue Division. Spanish Blood in Russia, 1941-1945*, (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2015)

of our solidarity, let us renew our faith in the destinies of our country under the watchful protection of our closely united Army and the Falange.⁴

The response to the Spanish regime's conduct by the victorious Allies in the West was to sentence it to diplomatic ostracism, which involved banishing it into isolation and international disapproval as a kind of political and ideological purgatory. This condemnation to ostracism and quarantine was the highest penalty applied because other priorities prevented more radical military or economic measures from being taken to provoke the fall of Franco. Indeed, the survival of Francoism after World War II can only be understood in light of the burning Anglo-American fear of reactivating the civil war once again in Spain and fostering the expansion of Communism in Western Europe at a time of budding tension between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the future of Europe.⁵ In June 1946, one top British official from the Labour Party government would confess in an internal memo in these harsh terms:

The fact remains that Franco is not a threat to anybody outside Spain, odious though his regime is. But a civil war in Spain would bring trouble to all the Western Democracies, which is what the Soviet Government and their satellites want.⁶

The first international condemnation of Francoism took place in San Francisco at the founding conference of the United Nations, to which the Spanish government was not invited, but which several exiled Republican leaders attended as observers. On 19 June 1945, the conference passed without objections the Mexican proposal expressly forbidding Francoist Spain from joining the UN. But the worst was yet to come. In early 1945, at the closing event of the crucial Potsdam Conference, the Soviet leader, Stalin, the new United States' President, Harry Truman, and the recently elected British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, issued a joint declaration on the "Spanish problem."⁷ The document ratified the condemnation of Francoist Spain to international ostracism in severe terms:

The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership of the United Nations put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States,

⁴ This speech was removed from the anthologies of Franco's speeches after the end of the world war. This is a reproduction of the text published in the Spanish press of the time: *Extremadura. Diario Católico*, 18 July 1941.

⁵ See Richard Wigg, *Churchill and Spain: The survival of the Franco Regime, 1940-45*, London: Routledge, 2005); Enrique Moradiellos, *Franco frente a Churchill. España y Gran Bretaña en la Segunda Guerra Mundial* (Barcelona: Península, 2005); Xavier Hualde, *El "cerco" aliado. EE.UU., Gran Bretaña y Francia frente a la dictadura franquista* (Bilbao: Universidad del País Vasco, 2016).

⁶ Minute of Oliver Harvey for Ernest Bevin (Foreign Office Secretary), 7 June 1946. Foreign Office Archive (FO), "General Correspondence" series (archive key: 371), file 60377, document Z5378. Henceforth referred to as FO 371/60377 Z5378. All British archives referred to are held at The National Archives (Kew, Surrey).

⁷ Jill Edwards, *Anglo-American Relations and the Franco Question, 1945-1955*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), pp.44-47; Enrique Moradiellos, "The Potsdam Conference and the Spanish Problem", *Contemporary European History*, 10:1 (2001), 73-90.

possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.⁸

Franco prepared himself to face the international campaign with a “policy of waiting” and stubborn resistance disguised behind a domestic cosmetic constitutionalism operation. He was convinced that the antagonism and conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States would soon be unleashed in Europe and that the latter would be compelled to turn to the services of Spain, due to its invaluable geo-strategic worth and its anti-Communist conviction.⁹ Hence, for the time being, the policy of waiting meant closing ranks around the regime, whether through conviction or by coercion, and obsessively recalling the dangers of Communism and the civil war (which was fostered by renewed guerrilla activities and the “invasion” of the Aran Valley). In late August 1945, a crucial report for Franco from Admiral Carrero Blanco (his loyal political secretary and virtual alter ego since 1941) dismissed the importance of the Potsdam condemnation as a mere rhetorical declaration of “notable impertinence” and revealed the accurate grounds for this policy of staunch endurance, awaiting better times:

In short, with the last shot in the Pacific, the diplomatic war between the Anglo-Saxon powers and Russia has begun. England and the United States are united against Russian imperialism [...]. In this obvious case of cold self-interest, the Anglo-Saxons (despite what they say on the radio, in the media and even the politicians, great and small) not only do not support, but oppose everything that could create a situation of Soviet hegemony in the Iberian Peninsula. They are interested in order and anti-Communism but would prefer to achieve this with a different regime to the current one. [...] The pressures of the Anglo-Saxons for a change in Spanish politics that breaks the normal development of the current regime will be much lower, the more palpable is our order, our unity and our impassivity to threats and impertinences. There can be no other formula for us than: order, unity and endurance.¹⁰

To overcome the inevitable period of toothless ostracism (which reached its peak with the withdrawal of Western ambassadors from Madrid in December 1946), in addition to the pseudo-democratic cosmetics, Francoist diplomacy endeavoured to gather and gain support from Catholic and anti-Communist circles throughout the world, in order to ease the international isolation as much as possible.¹¹ Within this adverse international context, Franco's Spain did not devote much attention to the economic and political integration process that was launched in Western Europe immediately after the war. Among other reasons, this is because, as a virtual international “outcast”, Francoism was barred access to the new European and international

⁸ The text of the communiqué is to be found in the minutes of the Potsdam Conference taken by the British delegation on 2 August 1945. FO 371/50867 U6197.

⁹ Florentino Portero, *Franco aislado. La cuestión española (1945-1950)* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1989); Javier Tusell, *Carrero. La eminencia gris del régimen de Franco*, (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1993).

¹⁰ “Notas sobre la situación política”, 29 July 1945. General Archives of the University of Navarre (Pamplona), documentary collection of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, series “Política Internacional”.

¹¹ Manuel Espadas Burgos, *Franquismo y política exterior* (Madrid: Rialp, 1988); Javier Tusell, Javier; Juan Avilés, and Rosa Pardo, Rosa (eds.), *La política exterior de España en el siglo XX* (Madrid: UNED-Biblioteca Nueva, 2000); Juan Carlos Pereira, (coord.). *La política exterior de España, 1800-2003* (Barcelona: Ariel, 2003); Julio Gil Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo* (Barcelona: Flor del Viento, 2008).

institutions and organisations created in that period: the Marshall Plan for the economic reconstruction of Europe in June 1947, NATO in April 1949 and the Council of Europe in May 1949. And in none of these cases did the Francoist appeal to the anti-Communist and Catholic nature of the regime bring about any success because its recent conduct during the war and its dictatorial nature led to repudiation amongst Western public opinion and eclipsed the value of its strategic position.

However, the intensification of the Cold War climate starting in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War fostered a partial, limited restoration of the Franco regime within the Western sphere, which would entail a tremendous economic and political cost for Spain itself. As the United States' Department of State acknowledged in an internal memorandum in April 1950, the "Spanish question" was basically "a matter that we believe must be decided in cooperation with our Western European allies" in view of the crucial fact that "their strategic interest in Spain is equal to ours but their political interests is greater". As a consequence:

The U.S. and most of these governments favour the earliest practicable integration of Spain into the Western European strategic pattern, but they still consider, as we do, public acceptance of Spain in these programs to be politically impracticable at this time. As long as our joint policy is based on the positive concept of strengthening and safeguarding Western democracy, and not merely on a negative reaction to Communism, it is difficult to envisage Spain as a partner in this collective effort unless and until there is some indication of evolution toward democratic government in Spain.¹²

Throughout this entire post-war period until the late '50s, the Franco regime held an official attitude of contempt toward the European integration process.¹³ As noted in this regard by Julio Crespo MacLennan, in his canonical study on the subject: "Europeanism did not play an important role in the propaganda mechanism of the early governments of the regime; the term was hostile to almost all its members."¹⁴ In particular, the Francoist dictatorship showed its clear hostility towards the first federal initiatives of the European Movement, whether in the form of the The Hague Congress in 1948 or in the foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949, the international organization behind the promotion and formulation of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.

In line with this policy of blatant hostile indifference, Franco himself set the tone to be followed with repeated contemptuous public expressions, such

¹² Memorandum on Spain by the Country Specialist in the Office of Western European Affairs (Dunham, April 15, 1950) attached to a Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Thompson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 21, 1950. *Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950*, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1977, vol. 3 (Western Europe), 1559.

¹³ Antonio Moreno Juste, *Franquismo y construcción europea (1951-1962)* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1997); Charles Powell, "España en Europa: de 1945 a nuestros días", *Ayer*, 49 (2003), 81-119 and "The Long Road to Europe: Spain and the European Community, 1957-1986" in J. Roy and M. Lorca-Susino (eds.), *Spain in the European Union. The First 25 Years (1986-2011)* (Miami: University of Miami Press, 2011), 21-44.

¹⁴ Julio Crespo MacLennan *España en Europa, 1945-2000. Del ostracismo a la modernidad* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004), 45.

as the one he made before the Spanish *Cortes* (Francoist pseudo-Parliament) on 18 May 1949:

We find the States of Europe so awkward, so old, so divided and their policies so full of Marxism, passions and resentment, that they have unwittingly driven us toward where our heart beckons: to closeness and understanding with the peoples of our lineage. America once again brings Spain its historical destiny and the sympathies of our nation leap toward it in the call of our blood, faith and language.¹⁵

This same anti-Europeanist mistrust is noted in the declarations of Catholic fundamentalist, Alberto Martín Artajo, who was highly effective as Franco's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1945 to 1957. After his dismissal in 1957, during the social and economic crisis that would prompt the change of course in 1957-1959, Martín Artajo publicly admitted:

One might say, perhaps exaggeratedly, that these attempts to construct a misshapen and overbearing supra-national Europe are, for the time being, the task of Socialist parties that would like to see the Socialist International proposal and programme become policy.¹⁶

The Francoist response to European ostracism consisted in the so-called "substitution policies", which held the United States and Latin American countries as irreplaceable, key reference points, not to mention the Vatican. And its basic means of support during those critical years of virtual international quarantine came from this three-fold source: from Argentina under General Peron, in the form of trade agreements in 1946 and 1947, from the Holy See, with the negotiation and signature of a new Concordat in August 1953, and from the United States, under the agreement to establish United States military bases on Spanish soil, signed in September 1953. This later agreement was a crucial step by which the US Government came to accept the need to bring Spain within the Western security system by a bilateral form of military cooperation outside NATO.

At that time, the attitude of Franco and his regime toward the budding process of European integration remained as mistrusting as it was sarcastic. In his 1956 New Year's Eve address, faced with the reality of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, Franco himself asserted:

These ambitious aspirations toward a United States of Europe, which cannot even be achieved for issues of vital interest, represent a fantasy that will quickly be thwarted by reality. The old nations of the West have, over centuries, built their own personalities, which cannot be erased.¹⁷

The Pressing Challenge of European Integration

The situation that arose after 1945 only began to change starting in 1957 for two reasons. On the one hand, on 25 March 1957, through the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the European integration process experienced a qualitative leap with the constitution of the European Economic Community (EEC) by the six founding countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,

¹⁵ Speech from the opening of the *Cortes*, 18 May 1949. Reproduced in *La Vanguardia española* (Barcelona), 19 May 1949.

¹⁶ Quoted in Crespo MacLennan, 46.

¹⁷ Speech broadcast on 31 December 1956. Reproduced in *La Vanguardia Española* (Barcelona), 1 January 1957.

Belgium and Luxembourg. On the other, the onset of an intense internal political and economic crisis in Spain, which ended in the creation of a new government determined to overcome the crisis by opening the economy to foreign countries and making domestic policy more flexible. This would be the government that would permanently abandon the Fascist-inspired dream of productive self-sufficiency (the so-called “autarchy”) and would embark upon a financial and economic modernisation process that included the entry of Spain into the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in January 1958 and into the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in May of that same year.

The first official Francoist reaction to the creation of the Common Market was cautious, and the press reported the news without going into detail. However, true to its custom, *Arriba* newspaper, the official voice of the sole party in the regime, did not hesitate to pick at ideological wounds by making allusions to old conspiracy theories (26 March 1957):

Without Adenauer personally, the old Europeanist obsession would still be an obscure abstraction. Western Germany will foot the expensive bill of the Common Market, which will be used to industrialise the French territories overseas. Europe is not just six countries, and this Europe - the fantasy work of Spaak - is lacking in authentic content, just as it was lacking in all the organisations created under ambiguous Masonic signs in Strasbourg.¹⁸

Apart from the public media reaction, within the Spanish government, scepticism reigned regarding the future of the initiative, with Franco and Carrero Blanco at the forefront, in opposition to their colleagues in the economic departments on this subject. At any rate, the Francoist elite on the whole viewed the EEC as an economic issue and the main concern at that time was the liberalisation of the economy and proper development of the Stabilisation Plan that was to begin in the summer of 1959. Despite this caution, one important measure was taken: “the establishment of the Inter-Ministry Commission to study the issues that the Common European Market, as a possible Free Trade Zone, could cause on the Peninsula” (decree approved in 26 July 1957 and published in the Spanish Official State Gazette, *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, in 21 August 1957).

The reason for this precautionary measure was firm and well-founded because, as the economist, Manuel Fuentes Irurozqui, would note at that time, Spain could not afford to be left out of the Common Market or the Euratom, since more than 60 percent of the country's exports were sent to Europe and 26 percent of its agricultural products were consumed in this zone.¹⁹ Furthermore, these same countries represented, hands down, the main import markets for the Spanish economy:

In 1960, the nine member states of the EEC [he includes the six founding members, plus Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark] supplied just 34.8 percent of all Spanish imports. By 1965, this percentage had risen to 47.8 percent. [...] The outlook, therefore, that can be gleaned from this is that

¹⁸ Crespo MacLennan, 59.

¹⁹ Crespo MacLennan, 61-62.

Spain depends on the European Economic Community to a great extent, as regards both exports and imports.²⁰

As regards the Spanish exports, the crucial importance of the ECC can be seen in the situation of 1961: the members states were the main commercial partners of Spain, accounting for 57 per cent of its exports in that year.²¹

At any rate, the Francoist regime was aware of the fact that the European integration process, expedited by the creation of the EEC, would have a decisive effect on Spain, but initially it limited itself to observing the process without making any decisions on the matter, for three basic reasons:

1). Between 1957 and 1961, there was a great deal of uncertainty about the results of the creation of the Common Market, and the belief that the EFTA (European Free Trade Association), led by Great Britain, would put a stop to the EEC's aspirations for integration persisted.

2). In contrast to the EFTA, the new EEC had political goals that were inadmissible to Francoism due to their proto-federalist, democratising stance.

3). All the government's efforts were focused on applying the change of economic course under the Stabilisation Plan and ensuring its successful outcome.²²

In the specific case of Franco, while he did indeed see the potential economic benefits that could come from membership in the EEC, his main concern lay in the implicit political effects. In his speech in Burgos on 1 October 1961 (Festivity of Exaltation of the *Caudillo*), he made the limits of any proximity between Spain and the new European organisation clear: respect for the Spanish political structure and the resulting absolute personal power that he had wielded since his victory in the civil war in 1939. In his own words:

The importance of the European integration movements are taken into account. However, integration of the Spanish economy into an international structure is being considered at length [...]. The European integration structures have a political content that must not be forgotten. Spain must progress at the same pace as Europe, but it must also preserve its political stability and independence without interference. For this reason, any possibility of integration must be analysed keeping in mind that the Spanish economy must not sustain any damage, and the political institutions to which Spain owes its standard of living, its reputation abroad and its firm international position must be preserved.²³

And his fears were soon confirmed. On 15 January 1962, at the suggestion of the spokesman of the German Social Democrats, Willi Birkelbach, the European Parliament passed the so-called "Birkelbach Report". This report set out three minimum conditions for those aspiring to

²⁰ Edmund Stillman, *El resurgir económico de España. Informe del Hudson Institute Europe* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Planificación, 1975), 156-157.

²¹ Ángel Viñas *et al.*, *Política comercial exterior de España*, vol. 3, (Madrid: Banco Exterior de España, 1979), 1335.

²² Moreno Juste, 31-36.

²³ F. Franco, *Discursos y mensajes del Jefe del Estado, 1960-1963*, Madrid, Publicaciones Españolas, 1964, 337.

membership in the EEC: one geographic condition (being a continental country), one economic condition (a certain level of production development), and one political condition. Namely:

Guaranteed existence of a form of democratic rule in the sense of a liberal political organisation is a condition for membership. States with governments that do not have democratic legislation, whose people do not participate in the government's decisions, either directly or through freely elected representatives, cannot expect to be admitted into the circle of countries composing the European communities.²⁴

Within this context, on 9 February 1962, the Spanish government decided to formally ask the Council of Ministers of the EEC to commence bilateral negotiations in order to achieve “an association capable of becoming full integration in due time” of Spain in the Common Market. In the application letter, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Fernando María Castiella, alluded to the only obstacle that such petition might prompt, from the Spanish perspective: “after going through the essential steps to bring the Spanish economy in line with the conditions of the Common Market”.²⁵

The Spanish application immediately opened up an intense debate within the Community governments, and not precisely because of the economic lag, but rather, because of its political implications, the pressure to the contrary by the European Parliament and the public opinions of diverse democratic countries.²⁶ The response was a diplomatic certificate of receipt of the application (7 March 1962) that only served to stimulate the former political mistrust.²⁷ Carrero Blanco had admitted to his closest collaborators his fears of the association initiative because the Common Market was “a stronghold of Masons, liberals and Christian Democrats.”²⁸ Having received this cold response, Franco was even more emphatic and explicit in his speech on the hill of Garabitas in Madrid, on 27 May:

Liberalism is one of the main doors through which Communism enters, and Spain has not been forgiven for having blocked that door and that path. Every effort, whether direct or indirect, is being made to exalt other

²⁴ Willi Birkelbach, “Rapport fait au nom de la commission politique sur les aspects politiques et constitutionnels de l’adhésion ou de l’association à la Communauté”, Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne. Documents de séance (1961-1962), doc. N° 122, 15/01/1962. See the original document at the Luxembourg archives of the Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE, digital portal: <http://www.cvce.eu>).

²⁵ The original version of this letter is held in the documentary collection of the CVCE in Luxembourg (www.cvce.eu).

²⁶ María Teresa La Porte, *La política europea del régimen de Franco, 1957-1962*, (Madrid: Eunsa, 1992); Ricardo Martín de la Guardia and Guillermo A. Pérez Sánchez, *La Unión Europea y España* (Madrid: Actas, 2002); Matthieu Trouvé, “La Diplomatie Espagnole face à l’Europe (1962-1986)”, in Michel Dumoulin and Antonio Ventura Díaz (ed.), *Portugal y España en la Europa del siglo XX* (Yuste (Cáceres): Fundación Academia Europea de Yuste, 2005), 177-200; Victor Fernández Soriano, “Las Comunidades Europeas frente al franquismo: problemas políticos suscitados por la solicitud española de negociaciones de 1962”, *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea*, 32 (2010), 153-174.

²⁷ Accusé de réception de la demande d’association de l’Espagne à la CCE, 7 mars 1962. The original version of this document is held in the digital archives of the CVCE in Luxembourg (www.cvce.eu).

²⁸ Quoted in Crespo MacLennan, 80.

“travelling companions” that follow practices that have proven around the world to pave the way for entry.²⁹

The political barrier that arose between Spain and the EEC was felt immediately after this initial application by the Francoist regime in the form of two consecutive phenomena: the Spanish reaction to the 4th Congress of the European Movement held in Munich in June 1962, and the persistence of the harshest Francoist repressive practices against the democratic opposition within Spain.

The Ever Present Problem: Francoism as a dictatorial regime.

The 4th Congress of the European Movement in 1962 represented a milestone in Spanish Europeanism because it was the first meeting between leaders of the internal opposition and those in exile, who had been mortal enemies during the civil war. At this meeting in Munich, for example, José María Gil Robles, the Catholic leader during the Second Republic, and Rodolfo Llopis, secretary general of the Socialist Party at that time, met. For all of them, Europeanism, and faith in the creation of Europe under a democratic system, had become a shared distinguishing feature and the meeting point for reconciliation amongst former enemies.³⁰ Enrique Tierno Galván, who was then one of the emerging Socialist leaders domestically, described the impact of the meeting in his memoirs:

Everything that was done in Spain in relation to anti-Francoist protest took on European hues. Spain was Europe to the extent that it was anti-Francoist. For us, Europe was an open window that allowed us to dream of democracy. [...] The consequences of Munich were profound. It was one of the events that triggered the acceleration of the process of evolution towards democracy.³¹

Indeed, in Munich, this new situation of opposition based on reconciliation and overcoming the trauma of the civil war was expressed for the first time. And it did so in the form of a joint resolution passed by the Congress on 6 June at the proposal of the Spanish delegation (led by Salvador de Madariaga, founder of the European Movement in 1948 and member of its Permanent Executive Committee since then). The text of the joint resolution restated the principle that the “integration of any country into Europe, whether in the form of membership or in the form of association”, demanded full respect of democratic institutions in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. As a consequence, “in the case of Spain”, two conditions should be fulfilled prior to proceeding towards membership or association:

1. Establishing truly representative and democratic institutions that guarantee that the Government is based on the consent of its citizens.

²⁹ F. Franco, *Pensamiento político de Franco. Antología* (texts selected and organised by Agustín del Río Cisneros), Madrid, Servicio Informativo Español, 1964, 440.

³⁰ María Elena Cavallaro, *Los orígenes de la integración de España en Europa. Desde el franquismo hasta los años de la transición* (Madrid: Sílex, 2009); Ricardo Martín de la Guardia, *El europeísmo. Un reto permanente para España* (Madrid: Cátedra, 2015)

³¹ Enrique Tierno Galván, *Cabos sueltos. Memorias* (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1981), 131, 291.

2. Effectively guaranteeing all human rights, especially those of individual freedom and freedom of opinion, and ceasing government censorship. [...].³²

Franco's response to the defiance in Munich was emphatic and extremely harsh. Besides the well-known punishments (exile or banishment) for the Spanish participants and the official denunciation of the Congress as a conspiracy by enemies of Spain, the validity of the “Fuero de los Españoles” (a substitute for the bill of rights passed in 1945) was revoked, and the press renewed its campaign against liberalism and democracy as the alleged gateway for Communism to take over. In reaction to these measures, throughout Europe protests and demonstrations against the Francoist regime were renewed.

But Franco and the Spanish regime did not budge even one millimetre in their positions. Quite the contrary. In April 1963, just one year after the first official Spanish application for association with the EEC, Franco ordered the execution of the Communist leader, Julián Grimau, who had been arrested and tried by a military court for alleged crimes committed during the civil war. The large number of pleas made on Grimau's behalf (including by Pope John XXIII and Nikita Khrushchev) did not sway Franco. This would be the last execution ordered for this reason, as it unleashed a new surge of condemnation of the regime for its repressive brutality.³³ Little wonder, even within Spain, the execution of Grimau served to bolster a new rejection movement that went far beyond Communist circles. As Tierno Galván would recall in his memoirs: “The very core of the opposition was shaken” by the death of Grimau.³⁴

Within this tumultuous context, the Spanish application for entry into the EEC lost any possible chance of success because the political barrier present had been clearly and radically exposed to the Community institutions and to public opinion in the member states. José María Gil Robles, in a private letter to another opposition leader within Spain, Dionisio Ridruejo, would accurately highlight this problem:

The fact is that the current Spanish government, for whatever reason, does not want to progress at all. It knows that, as is, it cannot join Europe, just as in the past, for the same reasons, it could not get aid under the Marshall Plan. But it is a lot easier, and of course, more convenient, to blame those who attended the Munich Congress for what is happening.³⁵

Faced with this problem, the Spanish government decided to take a more pragmatic, modest and less compromising direction in its European policy. It chose to avoid the issue of full integration and endeavoured to come up with an economic and trade arrangement, a true *modus operandi*, in its

³² Javier Tusell, *La oposición democrática al franquismo (1939-1962)* (Barcelona: RBA, 2012), p. 412; Joaquín Satrústegui, et al. *Cuando la transición se hizo posible. El “contubernio de Múnich”* (Madrid: Tecnos, 2013), 180.

³³ Cristina Palomares, *The Quest for Survival after Franco. Moderate Francoism and the Slow Journey to the Polls, 1964-1977* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 17-19; Pere Ysàs, *Disidencia y subversión. La lucha del régimen franquista por su supervivencia, 1960-1975* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), 126-129.

³⁴ Tierno Galván, 309.

³⁵ Crespo MacLennan, 87.

relations with the six countries in the EEC. On 14 February 1964, through its ambassador in Brussels, the Count of Casa Miranda, Spain sent the EEC a second application to begin “conversations aimed at defining the possible respective commitments”.³⁶ The Council of Ministers of the EEC then decided to accept the re-worded application on 2 June 1964, and authorised merely technical negotiations to commence, lacking any political character:

The Council, in accordance with its consistent policy, is willing to authorise the Commission to enter into conversations with the Spanish government in order to assess the economic issues facing Spain with the development of the European Economic Community.³⁷

Therefore, negotiations between Spain and the Community officially began on 4 July 1964 and went on for six years straight, until 29 June 1970. At that time, they ended when the so-called “Preferential Agreement between Spain and the European Economic Community” was signed in Luxembourg (rather than in Madrid, to avoid political complications). It was a simple provisional agreement governing economic, customs and trade issues, along the same lines as those previously signed with Morocco and Tunisia (in April 1969, much to Spain's chagrin). Yet it satisfied Spain's minimum interests and, in fact, paved the way for increasing an irreversible integration of the Spanish economy in Europe, from which there would be no turning back. Indeed, the agreement granted Spain an average reduction of 66 percent on customs duties for its industrial exports, compared to a 25 percent reduction granted by Spain on imports of capital goods and industrial products coming from the Community.³⁸ The significance of this agreement can be seen in one simple fact: by 1970, 41 per cent of Spanish imports came from the EEC and Spain sent 46.4 per cent of its exports there.³⁹

In any case, by the time the Preferential Agreement was signed in June 1970, the Francoist regime had already entered into a severe internal political crisis stage that would last until November 1975, with the death of General Franco at the age of 82. Within this context of internal crisis and renewed social and political unrest, the idea of Spanish integration into the EEC (which had expanded to nine in 1973 with the entry of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark) was completely discarded, because of the same political stumbling block that had been lurking behind the matter the whole time. Simply put: as long as Franco was alive and his dictatorship remained intact, Spain's entry into the EEC was totally ruled out.⁴⁰ This political servitude was acutely felt by one top Francoist official who, in those later years, became one of the leaders of the reformers amongst the Francoist elite: José María de Areilza, ex-ambassador in Paris at the time of the first Spanish application to join the EEC. Disappointed at Franco's reaction to the Munich Congress and the

³⁶ Lettre adressée le 14 février 1964 á Paul-Henri Spaak, président en exercice du Conseil de la Communauté économique européenne par le Comte de Casa Miranda, chef de la Mission diplomatique de l'Espagne auprès des Communautés européennes. The original version of this letter is held in the documentary collection of the CVCE in Luxembourg (www.cvce.eu).

³⁷ Réponse aux demandes d'association de l'Espagne á la CEE, 2 juin 1962. The original document is held in the digital archive of the CVCE in Luxembourg (www.cvce.eu)

³⁸ Powell, 2005, 90-91.

³⁹ Viñas 1979, 1314, 1336.

⁴⁰ Carlos Closa and Paul M. Heywood, *Spain and the European Union* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Roy and Lorca-Susino.

execution of Grimau, Areilza resigned from his positions in 1964 to become the secretary of the private council of Don Juan. In 1969, he publicly admitted what was already well known and feared by the best-respected leaders of the Spanish regime:

Here (in Madrid) they tell you about the association with the Common Market as if it were simply an issue of tariffs and citrus fruit and tomatoes. But don't you see that as long as we are negotiating with politicians who belong to the Socialist or the Christian Democrat parties, there will be no end to the distrust? (...) The liberal, democratic uniformity of Europe is the basis of integration and we are the exception in Europe.⁴¹

Conclusions

In effect, José María de Areilza was right: the persistent problem and obstacle that prevented any real progress for Spanish integration into the EEC lay in the authoritarian political structure of Francoism, a real and true Antidemocracy at all effects. And the 1970 agreement, resulting from eight years of tough negotiations, was little more than a mitigation for Spain, despite the fact that it would determine its relations with the EEC for the following sixteen years, until 1986, when democratic Spain accomplished its goal of joining the Community as a full-fledged member. In this regard, as in so many previous ones (the Marshall Plan, the Council of Europe or NATO, for example), the persistence of Francoism after the Second World War had entailed a crucial political and economic price and servitude for Spain.

⁴¹ Crespo MacLennan, 105.